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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

On April 2, 2007, Apple Inc. and EMI Music held a joint press conference in
London that may be the harbinger of significant changes in the digital music arena.1 This
press conference, whose attendees included EMI Group CEO Eric Nicoli and Apple CEO
Steve Jobs, unfolded in an environment of significant technological and commercial
changes in the music industry. The shift to the digital era has been a turbulent one for
many players in the music industry, particularly as a result of the widespread distribution
of unauthorized digital music files and the concurrent significant decline in record
industry sales.2 The Apple-EMI agreement permits Apple to sell EMI Music’s entire
digital music catalog without digital rights management (DRM),3 which represents a
significant shift from the previous policy of the major record companies. Such
companies have until this point typically required that music distributed in digital form
include DRM restrictions on use and copying.4
The Apple-EMI announcement should be considered in light of the recent
developments in the broader digital music market.5 Apple has in many respects played a
pivotal role in those developments, transforming itself from a technology company to an
entertainment company with its core strength in the sale and distribution of digital
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1
EMI Group Press Release, EMI Music Launches DRM-Free Superior Sound Quality Downloads Across
Its Entire Digital Repertoire, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.emigroup.com/Press/2007/press18.htm; Apple Inc.
Press Release, Apple Unveils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music on the iTunes Store, Apr. 2, 2007,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html.
2
See Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Interoperability, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare: Is the
Apple iPod Changing its Tune? (2007) (manuscript on file with authors).
3
See EMI Group Press Release, supra note 1; see also infra notes 26 to 32 and accompanying text.
4
With a few notable exceptions, such as Sony Rootkit software, which was anticopying software installed
on certain Sony CDs that also secretly collected security information from computers playing the CD,
music content contained on physical CDs has generally not been subject to DRM or other protective
measures to prevent copying. See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
5
See infra notes 115-128 and accompanying text.
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music.6 Apple derives its strength from the iPod portable digital music player, which is
currently the world’s dominant digital music device.7 Apple has also become one of the
largest sellers of musical content in the U.S.8 Although Apple has now agreed to
distribute music from the EMI catalog without DRM, many believe the technological
choices that Apple has made in the past surrounding DRM technology have laid the
foundation for Apple’s market dominance.9 Until now, Apple has facilitated its market
dominance by deliberately limiting interoperability with non-Apple devices and nonApple online music stores for iPod device and iTunes Music Store (“iTMS”) users.10
From a technology perspective, this bundling11 of the iPod with iTMS has been made
easier by virtue of Apple’s FairPlay DRM, which limits usage of music purchased from
iTMS.12 Apple’s bundling of the iPod and iTMS, which together form a network, has led
to lawsuits against Apple alleging antitrust violations ranging from tying to attempted
monopolization; some foreign jurisdictions have gone so far as to threaten to ban certain
Apple technologies on consumer protection grounds.13 This type of legal pressure has
likely played a role in Apple’s decision to sell digital music without DRM in partnership
with EMI.14
The technological choices that Apple has made in developing the iPod and iTMS
raise difficult questions about the emergence of new technologies, the development of
markets for innovative products, and how existing legal frameworks, including
intellectual property and antitrust laws, should deal with new technologies and new
6

See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
Id.
8
Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, Music’s New Gatekeepers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2007, at W1 (noting that
Apple is now one of the largest sellers of music in the U.S.).
9
See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
10
The iPod controversy highlights potential ambiguities in uses and understandings of the term
interoperability, particularly with respect to consumer devices. Interoperability may refer to technological
possibility, which might exist if any potential consumer could make a device interoperable. Under this
view of interoperability, devices might be characterized as interoperable despite the fact that only
technologically sophisticated consumers are able to interconnect the devices. Alternatively, interoperability
may refer to devices that are “plug and play,” where even technologically unsophisticated users are easily
able to interconnect devices. These differences in uses and understandings of the term interoperability are
evident in the iPod/iTMS controversy, where Steve Jobs sees Apple’s products as already interoperable
with those of competitors. In contrast, the lawsuits against Apple and assertions from European regulators
make different assumptions about what constitutes an interoperable device. The understandings of the term
interoperability by plaintiffs in lawsuits and European regulators are based on assumptions about what
should constitute an interoperable device, based at least in part on both the ability of users of average
technological sophistication as well as the number of intermediate steps that might be required to
interconnect devices. Discussions of interoperability in this article reflect the varied uses of the term in
different contexts but do not always identify the specific derivation or explicitly identify the assumptions
made about interoperability in particular instances. For further discussion of this point, see Sharpe &
Arewa, supra note 2.
11
While economists and some U.S. courts at times use the term “bundling” and the term “tying” separately,
this article will use the terms interchangeably. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION 103 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf (noting that
the term bundling “typically refers to a sale in which products are sold only in fixed proportions,” whereas
the term tying is typically used when the portions are not fixed. “Case law in the United States sometimes
uses the terms ‘tying’ and ‘bundling’ interchangeably.” (citations omitted)).
12
Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
13
Id.
14
Id.
7
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innovations. To address these questions, this Article examines the iPod/iTunes network
and argues that while innovation, intellectual property laws, and network effects may in
part explain Apple’s market dominance, consumer welfare should be taken into account
in legal assessments of the iPod/iTMS bundle, as well as the competitive market
consequences of Apple’s bundling. Specifically, where new technologies once increased
the choices available to consumers, growing recognition exists today that such
technologies may now unnecessarily constrain consumer choices.15
This Article lays out the topography of the Apple FairPlay controversy, looking
closely at the business and market environment within which the iPod/iTMS network
arose. This Article does not seek to draw conclusions about the legal status of the
iPod/iTMS network under existing laws. Rather, it outlines some ways in which existing
legal frameworks may be applied to the structures and behaviors associated with
companies’ development of technological and business innovations. Part II discusses the
iPod device, the iPod/iTMS bundle, and the broader business, technology and cultural
context within which the iPod and iTMS were deployed. Part III analyzes the antitrust
allegations against Apple and examines Apple’s behavior and success in light of the
network effects produced by the iPod/iTMS bundle. In conclusion, Part IV identifies
some questions courts should contemplate when considering the competitive concerns
raised by issues connected to technology choices such as those relating to FairPlay DRM
in the context of networks such as iPod/iTMS.
II. THE APPLE IPOD AS A BUSINESS, CULTURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL PHENOMENON
A. The Apple iPod Success

¶5

The iPod is an extremely successful product that has generated significant revenue,
visibility, and positive publicity for its creator Apple Inc.16 The iPod has become a
pervasive product in the digital era. Over one hundred million iPods have been sold,17
which demonstrates the success of the device as a cultural, business, and technological
phenomenon.18 The iPod also reflects Apple’s facility in business, marketing, and
product design.19 The success of the iPod was, however, by no means inevitable. Apple
did not have a first-mover advantage, yet it quickly garnered market share and emerged
as the dominant player in the market for digital music, digital video, and digital media
players. Since its launch, the iPod has become the dominant digital music player with a
market share in excess of 70%.20 Apple recently changed its name from Apple
Computer, Inc. to Apple Inc., which represents its recognition that its future business
15

Carlisle George & Navin Chandak, Issues and Challenges in Securing Interoperability of DRM Systems
in the Digital Music Market, 20 INT’L REV. L. COMP. & TECH. 271, 272 (2006) (noting the existence of
multiple incompatible digital music file formats today).
16
See STEVEN LEVY, THE PERFECT THING: HOW THE IPOD SHUFFLES COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND
COOLNESS 2 (2006) (noting that the term success falls far short of describing the iPod phenomenon).
17
Apple Inc. Press Release, 100 Million iPods Sold, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/09ipod.html.
18
See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
19
Jessie Scanlon, Apple Sets the Design Standard, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 7, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 341835.
20
Apple Financial Results Conference Call, Jan. 17, 2007, 2:00 PM PST at 3:35-4:03, available at
http://www.apple.com/quicktime/qtv/earningsq107 (noting that Apple iPod market share in the U.S. for
MP3 players was reported to be 72% by NPD with faster growth in international markets).
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endeavors are unlikely to be limited to computers.21 The success of the iPod is also at the
root of potential legal problems for Apple. Many of these potential problems relate to
Apple’s technology choices about interoperability with respect to the iPod/iTMS network
that have served to restrict consumer choices in important ways.22
B. The Apple iPod Problem
¶6

In a number of areas, the digital era has given consumers a broader range of
choices. The range of choices that the iPod gives consumers is a key element in it
becoming the first digital music player to experience large-scale success.23 The iPod
offers consumers alternative ways to experience music.24 The iPod/iTMS network,
however, has been deliberately constructed to restrict interoperability with other devices
and online music stores.25 Prior to the EMI announcement, Apple restricted consumer
choices through the use of DRM and technological protection measures (TPM) for digital
music purchased from iTMS.26 TPM are technologies intended to promote authorized use
of digital works that play a role in DRM systems.27 DRM technologies have become
prominent in the digital era as copyright owners have attempted to control access to and
uses of their works through technological measures such as encryption.28 The concerns
of copyright owners in the digital era led to the passage of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA),29 which imposes legal restrictions on circumventing DRM.30
While such restrictions do not prevent DRM from being hacked,31 they give copyright
owners a potential legal weapon that may be used in a variety of ways, including
anticompetitively.32
21

See Apple Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000110465907012760/a07-5119_18k.htm (noting that
Apple amended its bylaws on February 14, 2007 to reflect the Company’s recent name change to Apple
Inc.).
22
Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
23
Paul Thurrott, With iPod Success, Apple Takes “Network Effect” from Microsoft, WindowsIT Pro, Nov.
1, 2004, http://www.windowsitpro.com/Article/ArticleID/44376/44376.html?Ad=1 (noting the success of
the Apple player, despite the relative advantages of other players with respect to price, storage, and battery
life).
24
See generally LEVY, supra note 16.
25
Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
26
Id.
27
See Ian Kerr, If Left to Their Own Devices . . . How DRM and Anti-Circumvention Laws Can Be Used to
Hack Privacy, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 167, 167-71
(Michael Geist ed., 2005), available at http://iankerr.ca/content/view/22/70 (noting legislative reforms that
use the law to further enable DRM and facilitate its implementation as a primary means of enforcing digital
copyright).
28
Id. at 171. This article does not discuss many significant issues raised in discussions of DRM and TPM,
including issues relating to privacy and questions of control. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981
(1996).
29
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) (codified in
scattered sections of title 17 of the United States Code).
30
Id. at § 1201(b); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 830-45 (2001).
31
Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
32
Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
Interoperability, 62 WASH. & L. REV. 487, 489-90 (2005) (discussing some implications of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act for commercial competition in cases where producers of printer cartridges try to
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Apple uses FairPlay DRM to control redistribution of the digital music purchased
through iTMS.33 FairPlay enables Apple to administer specified usage rights for iTMS
music purchases.34 Prior to the EMI announcement, all music sold through iTMS used
FairPlay DRM, which is a variant of Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) technology, for
playback on the iPod and computers.35 Through FairPlay DRM, Apple has effectively
limited interoperability between iTMS and non-iPod players and the iPod player and
digital music stores other than iTMS.36 Apple has actively tried to prevent others from
creating interoperable products, as is evident in the Apple response to RealNetworks
Harmony technology.37
Apple’s use of DRM has led to accusations against Apple that FairPlay is an
anticompetitive constraint on consumer choice.38 Such constraints reflect significant
areas where the iPod limits consumers to fewer choices than some commentators feel
should be offered, particular with regard to the ability of consumers to play digital music
purchased from music stores other than iTMS on their iPod devices.39 The
interoperability restrictions have made Apple the subject of increasing criticism, threats
of legal action, and actual legal action connected to interoperability restrictions associated
with FairPlay DRM.40 The adoption of interoperable solutions in the digital music arena
is thus made more difficult on account of both current legal frameworks and the business
strategies of dominant market players.41
The iPod business model and Apple’s use of FairPlay DRM raise a number of
potential legal questions, including how existing legal frameworks such as intellectual
property and antitrust laws can be adapted to the business and technology models of the
digital era.42 Further, Apple’s adoption of FairPlay DRM limits consumer choices. Such
limitations are ironic since the iPod’s success has in part been based on the choices it has
offered consumers with respect to their consumption of music. The choices the iPod has
given music consumers in the digital era are a clear contrast to those offered by existing

suppress competition using the provisions of the DMCA); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1110-14 (2003) (discussing uses of the DMCA intended to suppress competition).
33
See Adam L. Penenberg, Digital Rights Management: How Apple, Microsoft, and Sony Cash in on
Piracy Prevention, SLATE, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2130300 (noting that a song purchased
on iTunes is kept on the purchaser’s hard drive as an encrypted file that is unlocked with a random
encryption key supplied by Apple and that Apple limits how consumers can use the file; also, noting that
consumers cannot distribute the digital file over the Internet or play it on anything other than iTunes or an
iPod, but that consumers can burn unlimited CDs and load the song on up to five computers and an
unlimited number of iPods).
34
Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2; George & Chandak, supra note 15, at 274-75 (describing the iTMS rights
model).
35
See AAC Audio, http://www.apple.com/quicktime/technologies/aac (noting that all music sold in iTMS
uses AAC technology); Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
36
Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
George & Chandak, supra note 15, at 282 (“The strong legal protection enjoyed by DRM systems
currently deters any commercial circumvention devices to aid consumers.”).
42
This article will focus on the nature of the Apple iPod/iTMS network while considering the antitrust
allegations against Apple. It will not focus to any significant degree on issues relating to intellectual
property.
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players in the music industry. The iPod’s success is thus based in part on its solution to
the problems faced by the music industry in the digital era.
C. The Problem the iPod Solved
¶10

The digital era created problems for existing music industry business models and
the role of the traditional recording industry as an intermediary.43 Prior to the digital era,
the recording industry exercised control over both the creation and distribution sides of
the recording industry. On the creative side, the music industry exercised significant
control over music creation and distribution.44 Much of the power of the music industry
derived from the importance of music distribution for musical artists.45 Through its
control of distribution, the music industry was thus able to exercise significant power
over the artists whose music it distributed.46 On the consumer side, the recording
industry constrained consumer choices through a bundling model.47 As a result of
bundling music on CDs and the limited ability of consumers to obtain individual songs
from such CDs,48 consumers were required to purchase unwanted music in order to obtain
the music they desired.49
¶11
The creation of digital formats such as the MP3 compression standard,50 combined
with the distribution mechanism of the Internet, has revolutionized the creation,
distribution, and consumption of music.51 Digital music has reduced the ability of the
recording industry to control distribution and creation. Digital technology enables artists
and consumers to make choices that previous industry business models may have denied
them.52 The convergence of digital music formats and Internet distribution enabled
consumers to unbundle their music purchases.53 Much of this unbundling was
43

Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See Kevin Zhu & Brian MacQuarrie, The Economics of Digital Bundling: The Impact of Digitization and
Bundling on the Music Industry, 46 COMM. ACM 264, 264 (2003),
http://web.gsm.uci.edu/kzhu/PDFfiles/Papers_Abstract/CACM_DigitalBundling_p264-zhu_published.pdf
(“Bundling can be very effective as both a profit-maximizing tool and as a competitive weapon . . .”).
48
Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
49
LEVY, supra note 16, at 44 (noting that with the advent of the CD, which “ripped the needle across the
surface of the LP age,” artists had a full hour to fill with no natural breaking point when the listener could
flip over a record, which resulted in extra space being filled with second-rate offerings).
50
David Hesmondhalgh, Digitalisation, Copyright and the Music Industries, in UNPACKING DIGITAL
DYNAMICS: PARTICIPATION, CONTROL AND EXCLUSION (Peter Golding, & Graham Murdock eds., 2006),
available at http://www.cresc.ac.uk/publications/documents/wp30.pdf (discussing MP3 compression
standards).
51
Tom McCourt, Collecting Music in the Digital Realm, 28 POPULAR MUSIC & SOC’Y 249, 250 (2005)
(“[P]opularity of MP3 files and related formats . . . indicates that access and convenience are increasingly
more important than artifact and sound quality.”).
52
Jesse Bockstedt, Robert J. Kauffman & Frederick J. Riggins, The Move to Artist-Led Online Music
Distribution: Explaining Structural Changes in the Digital Music Market, PROC. 38TH HAW. INT’L
CONFERENCE SYS. SCI. 1, 7 (2005), available at
http://misrc.umn.edu/workingpapers/fullpapers/2004/0422_091204.pdf (“Digital music providers act as
product/service providers by dealing directly with the end customer. The emerging digital music market
supports dramatically reduced production and distribution costs.”).
53
Zhu & MacQuarrie, supra note 47, at 265 (“Recently, however, digital formats have forcibly unbundled
the CD. Online, consumers can now purchase custom CDs containing only songs they wish to purchase,
44
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accomplished through the use of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file sharing networks such as
Napster, whose users increased from zero in June 1999 to 20 million in July 2000.54 P2P
file sharing emerged as the recording industry was experiencing a significant decline in
music sales.55 Although the recording industry has tended to place the blame for
declining record sales on illegal downloads,56 other studies suggest a range of potential
factors,57 including saturation in the CD market,58 P2P downloads, and other factors.59
¶12
The recording industry and its principal lobbying arm, the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA),60 have managed to develop a comprehensive litigation
strategy for dealing with the implications of unauthorized digital downloads.61 This
litigation strategy and the prevention of unauthorized digital downloads on which it is
based have contributed to the shape of business models in the digital era, although
innovative business models in this area have largely come from outside of the traditional
music business players.62 The recording industry has consequently not developed
effective business strategies for confronting the implications of the digital era.63 Its
failure to adjust to the business realities of the digital era left room for companies such as
Apple to develop business models that created legal means by which consumers could
purchase digital music. The interactions between technology players and content owners
in the digital era underscore the ways in which the music industry has been slow to adjust
to the conceptual and business realities of digital music and its broader implications.64 In
contrast, Apple and other players in the digital music arena created innovative digital era
business models. Apple, for example, makes little money from sales of digital downloads

and eventually digital distribution will mean that consumers might desire individual songs rather than
albums.”).
54
Bockstedt et al., supra note 52, at 9.
55
Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music 50-60 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 11282, 2005), available at
http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/499.pdf (discussing declining music industry CD sales).
56
See RIAA.com, What the RIAA is Doing About Piracy, http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/riaa.asp (last
visited May 25, 2007); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record
Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (2007), available at
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JPE31618PDF (noting that the RIAA blames declining
record sales on unauthorized file sharing).
57
Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, supra note 56, at 3 (concluding through empirical analysis that file sharing
has an effect on music sales that is statistically indistinguishable from zero); Connolly & Kruger, supra
note 55, at 50-60.
58
Hesmondhalgh, supra note 50, at 3.
59
Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, Plunge Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2007, at A1
(discussing factors underlying decreasing music sales, including the closing of many retail outlets where
music could be purchased).
60
LEVY, supra note 16, at 23-24 (describing the arguments of the RIAA, the lobbying and legal arm of the
recording industry, with respect to digital music).
61
Id. at 27-31 (describing digital era music lawsuits by the RIAA in response to different technologies);
Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-thepeople.php (last
visited June 6, 2007).
62
Smith, supra note 59 (discussing the advent of innovative niche record stores).
63
LEVY, supra note 16, at 31-32 (describing music industry digital music services, including Pressplay and
MusicNet, and describing such services as “pathetic, half-hearted efforts”); Connolly & Kruger, supra note
55, at 60-61 (noting the efficiency of P2P distribution networks and the likelihood that the business model
for the distribution of music will change dramatically in the future).
64
LEVY, supra note 16, at 27-50 (illustrating the gulf between technology industry players in the Silicon
Valley and music industry players in Hollywood in the digital music era).
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on iTMS.65 Apple instead makes significant profits from the iPod.66 It is probably not an
accident that purchases from most other digital music stores cannot easily be played on
the iPod.67 Apple’s strategy of deliberate non-interoperability prevents other digital
music players from accessing iTMS and protects Apple’s iPod franchise.
¶13
The Apple iPod and iTMS business model helps free consumers from previous
recording industry constraints such as CD bundling. At the same time, however, the
iPod/iTMS solution for digital downloads imposes a new bundling configuration that
limits consumer choices. The constraints imposed by Apple FairPlay DRM are of
concern to a range of consumer advocates, particularly in Europe.68 The iPod is currently
the most successful device that provides alternatives to illegal downloads. As the iPod
has increased in popularity, however, the effects of Apple’s technology choices on
current and prospective Apple competitors and consumers have raised legal questions.
Specifically, consumers and government agencies in the U.S. and Europe have
challenged Apple’s business model on antitrust grounds.69
III. APPLE, ANTITRUST ALLEGATIONS, AND NETWORKS
¶14

Antitrust laws seek to protect consumer welfare by preventing anticompetitive
practices, such as the illegal use or maintenance of monopoly power. A firm, however,
does not necessarily violate the antitrust laws when the monopoly power it possesses is “a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”70 For many
firms, the chance to extract monopoly rents may provide an incentive to innovate and
take risks that stimulate economic development.71 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
noted that “[t]he mere possession of monopoly power and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system.”72
¶15
Apple is the clear market leader in the online digital music space. Apple’s position
as a market leader therefore raises questions as to whether Apple’s success is the result of
a superior product or business acumen, the willful maintenance of monopoly power
through anticompetitive practices such as unlawful tying facilitated by Apple’s FairPlay
DRM, the skillful development of technology products, the exercise of intellectual
property rights, or some combination of these factors.

65

Wingfield & Smith, supra note 8 (“Apple isn't under as much pressure to squeeze profits from iTunes
because of the money it makes on iPods. In fact, it earns little from iTunes after paying fees for the music
and credit-card processing. iTunes typically pays major labels about 72 cents a track, while it pays most
independent labels around 62 cents.”).
66
Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
67
Id.
68
An extensive literature exists concerning the implications of DRM generally. See supra notes 27-32 and
accompanying text.
69
See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
70
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
71
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
72
Id.

339

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2007

A. The Apple iPod/iTMS Network
¶16

One way to explain Apple’s success is through a network lens. Networks are
characterized by products that increase in value to consumers to the extent that the
products are widely adopted.73 This is known as a “network effect.”74 Network effects
may be direct or indirect.75 Telecommunications networks are the most recognizable
network subject to direct effects. A telephone becomes more valuable to the owner as
more households install telephones, broadening the network of individuals that can be
contacted with the device. An indirect network effect, on the other hand, is one where
the increased network value results in greater consumer demand for complementary
products and greater consumer demand for complementary products increases the value
of the network. For example, as more households purchased VCRs, the demand for
movies on videocassettes increased,76 as did the demand for ancillary business services
such as video rentals. Similarly, as more consumers demanded movies on videocassettes
the value of VCRs to their owners increased.
¶17
The Apple network is an excellent example of a network with indirect effects. The
interconnected nature of various Apple products and services is an important part of
Apple’s business strategy. Apple’s success in advancing this strategy is evident in the
effects from the iPod and iTMS network. An iPod’s primary function is to provide
digital media content, serving as a device for viewing, listening to and storing that
content. iPod owners derive benefits from the ease with which the iPod interconnects to
a personal computer and iTMS.
¶18
Arguably, users of both the iPod and iTMS have experienced the benefits of
network effects. One benefit, interoperability between iTMS and the iPod, allows
customers to perform a broad spectrum of tasks using Apple’s iTunes software
application. iTunes “allow[s] customers to preview, purchase, download, organize, share,
and transfer digital content to an iPod” and their computer.77 Moreover, as more iPods
are sold, third parties develop more add-ons, expansions, and compatible products,
further increasing the value of the network.78 According to Apple’s 2006 Annual Report,
73

See George Priest, Flawed Efforts to Apply Modern Antitrust Law to Network Industries, in HIGH STAKES
ANTITRUST: THE LAST HURRAH? 117, 118-19 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2003) (arguing that networks are thus
different than a “hard goods industry” where “one consumer’s use of the good has little or no impact on the
use by any other consumer”); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
74
Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, Presentation at the Progress and Freedom
Foundation Conference 2 (Sept. 22, 1998), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/software.pdf (arguing that “the most notable” characteristic that
distinguishes software markets from other markets is that they “often are subject to network effects,
whereby the value of a piece of software (e.g., an operating system) rises with the number of other end
users who run that same software. These effects arise both because the ability to communicate and share
data with others will be greater, and because it is more likely that complementary hardware, software, and
wetware (i.e., brain cells) will be available, when there is a large base of users of the software.”; also noting
that network effects are not limited to software markets but may arise in any market).
75
Mark A. Lemley & David MacGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV.
479, 481 (1998) (suggesting ways in which particular legal rules should and should not be modified to take
account of network effects).
76
See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 96 (1999).
77
Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 12 (Dec. 29, 2006).
78
Apple Computer, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Dec. 3, 2004) (“With the addition of third-party
iPod peripherals, the capabilities of certain iPods can be enhanced to include voice recording and photo
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“[i]n addition to [Apple’s] iPod accessories, thousands of third-party iPod compatible
products are available.”79 Apple iPod/iTMS network participants derive greater value as
network size increases as evidenced by the growth in the type and number of available
offerings.
¶19
Networks have the potential to both enhance and inhibit competition. A successful
network may increase the number of choices available to a consumer. At the same time,
one company’s proprietary network may produce products that are not interoperable with
technology from rivals, or it could exclude competitors entirely. Ultimately, either
scenario reduces consumers’ choices. Consequently, networks present unique challenges
to antitrust laws. Behaviors that are traditionally viewed as anticompetitive – such as
tying, predatory pricing and exclusive dealing – may have persuasive procompetitive
justifications when considered from a network perspective.80 However, the same
behaviors may have pernicious effects, such as delayed innovation, lower output, and
higher prices.
¶20
The ability of products to interoperate makes networks more valuable.81 This is
particularly true in the technology arena, where the proliferation of devices, from
computers to cellular phones, drives the need for new software applications that will
operate on multiple devices.82 Proprietary technologies that limit interoperability to
products within a network exclude technology from rivals, and may result in a wider
range of choices for customers by spurring innovation as competitors develop their own
proprietary technologies. In this instance, each player may seek to establish a de facto
industry standard and thus is “competing for the market.”83 Similarly, open standards
across a market may promote competition by spurring competition for a larger share of
the market among firms that use a common standard.84 In environments with open
standards, consumers can benefit from both the positive externalities within a single

downloading directly from certain digital cameras.”); see also Posting of Christopher Breen to
Today@Playlist, http://playlistmag.com/weblogs/todayatplaylist/2004/12/giftweeksoftware/index.php
(Dec. 8, 2004, 18:29 EST) (discussing numerous third-party applications for the iPod).
79
Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (Dec. 29, 2006) (“In addition to the Company’s own iPod
accessories, thousands of third-party iPod compatible products are available, including portable and
desktop speaker systems, headphones, car radio solutions, voice recorders, cables and docks, power
supplies and chargers, and carrying cases and armbands.”).
80
See Max Schanzenbach, Network Effects and Antitrust Law: Predation, Affirmative Defenses, and the
Case of U.S. v. Microsoft, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶ 3, ¶ 47 (2002) (discussing the challenges that
technology industries present for antitrust laws, identifying affirmative defenses premised on the existence
of network effects that Microsoft neglected to advance during the course of its antitrust case, and noting
that “[t]here are a number of pro-competitive reasons for a tie as well, beyond the obvious economies in
production and distribution that a tie may produce. First, a tie may control quality. For example, a
manufacturer may tie the sale of repair services and parts to the purchase of its machine in order to ensure
that it is maintained properly and that the firm's reputation for quality is protected. Second, a tie may help
share the risk of a product purchase or provide information to consumers about product value. Third, a tie
may stimulate demand for complementary products. Finally, a tie may aid in price discrimination by
measuring the intensity of use.”) (citations omitted).
81
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11, at 33.
82
Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
623, 634-35 (2002).
83
SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 76, at 231 (“Precisely because standards reduce lock-in, they shift the
locus of competition from an early battle for dominance to a later battle for market share. Instead of
competing for the market, companies compete within the market, using the common standard.”).
84
Id.
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network or from other networks and products that interconnect.85 Switching costs are
lower, thus reducing the extent to which consumers are locked in.86 Apple’s control over
the iPod’s and iTMS’s interoperability can, and probably has, appreciably increased the
value of its network and is central to Apple’s alleged antitrust violations.87
B. Antitrust Allegations Against Apple
¶21

In recent months, Apple has been the target of lawsuits and threats of legal action
due to the iPod/iTMS network’s alleged noninteroperability with competitors’ products.88
France recently enacted a law to implement the European Union Copyright Directive,
which the American press has referred to as the “iTunes law.”89 This law has been
characterized as forcing Apple to make its products interoperable with those of other
companies,90 although the final version of the enacted French law contained a significant
exception that enables companies such as Apple to continue to use DRM that restricts
interoperability with permission of the applicable rights holders.91 Additionally, several
consumer protection groups from Finland, Norway, France, and Germany recently issued
a joint statement declaring that Apple should make music sold through iTMS
interoperable with portable digital music players other than the iPod.92 The extent to
85

Id. at 233.
Id.
87
Id. at 197 (noting that a “network is far more valuable if you can control the ability of others to
interconnect with you”).
88
See Complaint, Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879 (N.D. Cal. July
21, 2006); Slattery v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 05-00037 JW, 2005 WL 2204981 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9,
2005); John Leyden, Apple faces US iTunes lawsuit, THE REGISTER, Jan. 3, 2007,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/03/apple_itunes_lawsuit/ (noting that the U.S. lawsuit “follows
similar charges in Europe, brought by a French consumer rights group.”); Apple Inc., Quarterly Report
(Form 10-Q), at 46-55 (Dec. 30, 2006) (discussing actions against Apple, including Union Fédérale des
Consummateurs - Que Choisir v. Apple Computer France S.à.r.l. and iTunes S.à.r.l., a suit filed by a
French consumer association in February 2005 against Apple that alleges violations of French consumer
law by: “(1) omitting to mention that the iPod is allegedly not compatible with music from online music
services other than the iTunes Store and that the music from the iTunes Store is only compatible with the
iPod and (2) allegedly tying the sales of iPods to the iTunes Store and vice versa.”); Tom Braithewaite &
Kevin Allison, Crunch Time for Apple’s Music Icon, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at 27, available at
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?id=060613007896&page=2 (dated June 13, 2006) (“Last week, Norway,
Denmark and Sweden said Apple must make music tracks downloaded from iTunes playable on rival
devices or get out of their countries. Finland is also looking at intervening.”).
89
See generally Mikko Välimäki & Ville Oksanen, DRM Interoperability and Intellectual Property Policy
in Europe, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 562, available at
http://www.valimaki.com/org/drm_interoperability_final.pdf (discussing the French iTunes law).
90
LOI n° 2006-961 du 1er août 2006 relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de
l'information (Aug. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=MCCX0300082L.
91
French Bend on iTunes Law, WIRED, June 26, 2006, available at
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/06/71220 (noting that the compromise text of the
law “maintains a Senate loophole that could allow Apple and others to sidestep that requirement by striking
new deals with record labels and artists”); France Softens iTunes Law, but Apple Still Disgruntled, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006, at C2, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/technology/23ipod.html?ex=1308715200&en=4c03604b5706e878&e
i=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss (noting that the French National Assembly maintained “a loophole
introduced last month by senators, which could allow Apple and others to dodge data-sharing demands by
striking new deals with record labels and artists”).
92
The four consumer protection groups are the Consumer Ombudsmen in Finland and Norway, the French
86
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which such actions will lead to restrictions on Apple’s European business model and
business activities remains unclear and will depend on actions taken by consumer groups
and authorities going forward. The threatening allegations made and legal actions filed
against Apple highlight the nature of potential claims that might be made against Apple
on account of iPod/iTMS bundling.
¶22
In the U.S., two cases filed against Apple in the Northern District of California are
currently pending.93 Both complaints allege that Apple has tied its iPod to iTMS by
conditioning iPod sales on the purchase of digital content from iTMS, and vice versa.94
From an antitrust perspective, Apple’s sale of iTMS content to be played on the iPod
raises questions of whether an illegal tie actually exists. Can Apple be guilty of unlawful
tying when an essential element of that offense is that the sale of one product (the tying
product) must be conditioned on the purchase of another (the tied product)?95 Is the sale
of iTMS digital content truly conditioned on the purchase of an iPod?96 Few would argue
that an iPod is the only way to enjoy the content purchased from iTMS. The scope of the
usage rights that accompany content purchased from iTMS clearly reflects the fact that
the iPod is not the only means by which consumers may consume iTMS content.97 Many
buyers replay digital media purchased online through iTMS and other online stores on
their computers. Additionally, FairPlay and other DRM protection measures can be
circumvented to make music downloaded from any online media store, including iTMS,
playable on a variety of portable digital music players, including the iPod.98 In the case
of digital music files, for example, a user simply needs to make a copy of the song in a
different format, such as MP3, and then transfer the content in that format to their music
player of choice.99 Such transfers may, however, involve a loss of sound quality in the
transferred digital file.
Consumer Organization, UFC Que Choisir, and the Federation of German Consumer Organizations (vzbv).
Forbrukerombudet.no, European Consumer Organisations Join Forces in Legal Dispute Over iTunes Music
Store, http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/index.gan?id=11037079 (last visited June 7, 2006); see also John
Oats, France and Germany Join Anti-iTunes Crusade, THE REGISTER, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/23/itunes_slagged_again (“France and Germany are joining the
Scandinavian campaign to make content from iTunes work with players from companies other than
Apple.”).
93
The first domestic case against Apple was Charoensak v. Apple Computer, Inc. (formerly Slattery v.
Apple Computer, Inc.) which contained allegations of “unlawful tying of music purchased on the iTunes
Store with the purchase of iPods and vice versa and unlawful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly
market power.” Apple Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 30, 2006); see also Complaint at ¶¶ 6071, 72-75, 80-102, Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 20, 2006).
94
Complaint at ¶¶ 60-71, Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 20, 2006); Slattery v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 05-00037 JW, 2005 WL 2204981, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 9, 2005).
95
See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). But cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984).
96
This tying allegation highlights tensions between varied uses and understandings of the term
interoperability. See supra note 10.
97
See generally George & Chandak, supra note 15.
98
Digital Music Interoperability and Availability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. n.6-7 (2005) (statement
of Mark Cooper, Ph.D, Director of Research, Consumer Federation of America), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/cooper040605.pdf [hereinafter Hearings] (describing the process a
user must go through to transfer music from iTMS to players other than the iPod).
99
Siobhan Hughes, Apple Gets Vote of Confidence for iTunes from Antitrust Chief, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14,
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At the core of both cases are allegations that Apple used technological protections
or restrictions to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the relevant markets. For
instance, the Tucker Plaintiff alleges that Apple did the following to maintain its
monopoly:
(1) actively [modified] the iPod’s “core processor,” the Portal Player
System-On-A-Chip, not to support WMA; (2) actively [modified] the iPod
Shuffle’s SigmaTel chip not to support WMA; (3) [refused] to pay a
nominal licensing fee for WMA; (4) [used] technological restrictions to
prevent consumers who purchased [from] rival stores from playing music
on their iPods; (5) [sold] music only using Apple’s FairPlay DRM, which
is incompatible with any digital music player other than iPod; and (6)
[used] technological restrictions to prevent users from playing video files
purchased from Apple on rival video-enabled music players.100

¶24

Each allegation circles back to an alleged lack of interoperability between the iPod,
iTMS and other products in the relevant markets.101 If Apple did not dominate each
relevant market, it would lack the requisite monopoly power to support a tying claim
based on music encoded with FairPlay DRM being exclusively interoperable with the
iPod. Consequently, Apple might avoid antitrust scrutiny since any prospective plaintiff
could not allege that the sale of either the iPod or iTMS is conditioned on the purchase of
the other.
¶25
In response to the lawsuits and other criticisms of FairPlay DRM, Steve Jobs
argued in a February 2007 open letter that Apple does not overly limit consumer choice.
He stated that “it is useful to remember that all iPods play music that is free of any DRM
and encoded in ‘open’ licensable formats such as MP3 and AAC. iPod users can and do
acquire their music from many sources, including CDs they own.”102 According to Jobs,
the FairPlay DRM is necessary for Apple to ensure compliance with its signed
agreements with the record companies.103 Apple clearly believes that in light of these
contractual obligations, the current usage rights are the “most liberal . . . available in the
industry for legally downloaded music.”104
¶26
Jobs’s assertions do not necessarily convey in full the reality of the portable digital
music player competitive landscape. The vast majority of digital music consumers use
the iPod as their primary digital music player and iTMS as their primary online digital
2006, at B5 (quoting the Chief of the Antitrust division at the Department of Justice, Thomas O. Barnett,
“consumers can re-record an iTunes song in an MP3 format and play it on other devices; in sum, it is hardly
clear that they are locked in.”); see Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2 (discussing how such actions may create
legal problems to the extent that they involve circumvention of a TPM, which may be illegal).
100
See Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
20, 2006) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss).
101
For a more in depth discussion of the effects of interoperability or compatibility on price competition
see generally Katz & Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, supra note 74.
102
Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic.
103
See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2; see also Jobs, supra note 102 (“[A] key provision of our agreements
with the music companies is that if our DRM system is compromised and their music becomes playable on
unauthorized devices, we have only a small number of weeks to fix the problem or they can withdraw their
entire music catalog from our iTunes store.”).
104
Jobs, supra note 102.
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music store.105 While some tech savvy users may have alternatives, for most others, their
own technological limitations106 may mean that use of Apple’s products does not reflect a
preference for such products.107 Instead, it may reflect a lack of choice stemming from
high switching costs, one of which is learning alternative downloading methods.108 For
such users, Apple may be the sole available alternative. This lack of choice is of
potentially greater significance due to Apple’s allegedly monopolistic behavior and
alleged monopoly power.
¶27
The lack of iPod and iTMS interoperability with other devices and music stores in
the online digital music space and the consequent high switching costs have accelerated
the market tipping in Apple’s favor.109 Network effects heighten the possibility that
tipping may occur, resulting in a lone, dominant network, and an increased risk of
monopolization.110 Tipping raises the possibility that practices such as tying and
exclusive dealing, which are often used to outperform rivals, may have pernicious results.
One such concern is that “a firm that is dominant in one market may use such practices to
tip the market for a related product in its direction, even if its variant of that product is an
inferior one.”111
¶28
One tension evident from the claims against Apple is that Apple may have had
incentives to make its network inoperable with other online music sites and other digital
media players.112 Specifically, Apple has maintained a closed network and has refused to
make its products interoperable with those of its competitors.113 This refusal reduces the
likelihood that any competitor will gain enough of a foothold in any of the relevant

105

See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
See Hearings, supra note 98, at n.6-7 (statement of Mark Cooper) (“While iTunes allows consumers to
burn purchased protected digital music to a CD – an open platform – it must be pointed out that a consumer
would need to install a new program, purchase the song, burn the song to CD, rip the burned CD into a
format their current player will understand and then enter all the song information manually – a
cumbersome process digital music stores were supposed to make automatic . . . . A consumer with an iPod
and Windows might have more luck if they followed the steps in Footnote 6, but users with a Mac are out
of luck – and won’t be able to download that song legally.”).
107
See Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06-04457 JW, 2006 WL 2430879, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
20, 2006) (“Plantiff alleges two theories of antitrust tying: (1) Apple has used technological restrictions to
force purchasers of Apple's iPod (tying product) to purchase only Online Music and Online Video from
iTMS (tied product); and (2) Apple has used technological restrictions to force purchasers of Online Music
and Online Video from iTMS (tying product) to purchase only Apple's iPod (tied product).”).
108
Other costs would include the difficulty of identifying and acquiring the equipment, abandoning a
familiar product where users are comfortable with the interface and functionality of the product and loss of
any data that is not transferable to the new product. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 76, at 117
(outlining various categories of switching costs including “[b]rand-specific training” which includes
“[l]earning a new system, both direct costs and lost productivity”).
109
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 105106 (1994) (describing “tipping” as “the tendency of one system to pull away from its rivals in popularity
once it has gained an initial edge.”).
110
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 7.
111
Id.
112
See Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 673, 682 (1999) (“[L]ack
of compatibility can be the death-knell of a new technology, even if it is superior in some absolute or standalone sense. And incumbent firms often have the incentive to exert their intellectual property rights to deny
such compatibility to would-be entrants.”).
113
Apple may be retreating from this position. See infra note 115-123 and accompanying text (discussing
Apple’s recent announcement that it has partnered with EMI to offer some songs in DRM-free AAC
format); see also Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2.
106
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markets to create a viable alternative network. As a result, Apple products currently
dominate the market for portable digital players and digital music and video content.114
¶29
Even without DRM, Apple could continue to limit interoperability because the
AAC file format in which iTunes encodes digital music files, by default, is not supported
by many digital music players.115 This is important given that Jobs’s open letter has
borne fruit. In this letter, Jobs suggested that the recording industry “abolish DRMs
entirely.”116 He also indicated that Apple would be willing to sell DRM-free music
through iTMS if the music companies would license Apple to sell music without DRM.117
Jobs noted that this solution would be “clearly the best alternative for consumers, and
Apple would embrace it in a heartbeat.”118 Not surprisingly, shortly after this letter was
released, Apple and EMI jointly announced that Apple would distribute some portion of
the EMI catalog without DRM.119 The fact that EMI was the first of the big four music
companies to sell music free of DRM is no surprise, since they are known as the
recording industry player most eager to license and have thus far had weak online
sales.120 In May 2007, Apple began distributing higher quality digital audio files in AAC
format at 256 kbps, which is twice the rate of current files that are encoded in AAC
format at 128 kbps.121 These DRM-free music files, which will cost $1.29, or 30 cents
more than current iTMS songs, will, according to Apple, have an audio quality
indistinguishable from the original recording.122 Tracks previously purchased from iTMS
are upgradeable to the DRM-free file standard for 30 cents.123 Industry analysts suggest
that the other big record labels are taking a wait-and-see attitude in order to evaluate
whether the Apple-EMI arrangement is successful before they follow EMI’s lead.124
114

See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 76, at 180 (noting that rivals to Microsoft’s operating systems “[do
not] have the critical mass to pose much of a threat”).
115
Posting of Jenn K. Lee to anythingbutipod, EMI to Offer DRM-Free Digital Music,
http://anythingbutipod.com (Apr. 2, 2007, 20:50 EST) (“[F]orgive us for being less than thrilled over the
upcoming availability of more expensive music encoded in a format that few players actually support.”).
116
Jobs, supra note 102.
117
Id. (“The third alternative is to abolish DRMs entirely. Imagine a world where every online store sells
DRM-free music encoded in open licensable formats. In such a world, any player can play music
purchased from any store, and any store can sell music which is playable on all players. This is clearly the
best alternative for consumers, and Apple would embrace it in a heartbeat. If the big four music companies
would license Apple their music without the requirement that it be protected with a DRM, we would switch
to selling only DRM-free music on our iTunes store. Every iPod ever made will play this DRM-free
music.”).
118
Id.
119
Ethan Smith & Nick Wingfield, EMI to Sell Music Without Anticopying Software – Online-Strategy
Shift Breaks with Industry on Combating Piracy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2007, at B5 (noting that EMI is “the
world's third-largest music company by sales after Universal Music Group and Sony BMG Music
Entertainment . . . .”).
120
LEVY, supra note 16, at 35 (noting that EMI is known as the most eager of the big four to license, while
Universal, with the biggest market share, is known as the “hardliner in the digital music wars”); Hiawatha
Bray, Apple, EMI to Revamp Online Music Offerings, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2007, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2007/04/02/apple/?p1=MEWell_Pos5 (noting weak EMI online
sales).
121
Apple Inc. Press Release, supra note 1.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Laura Sydell, EMI Music Goes DRM-Free in a Deal with Apple, All Things Considered, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9293489 (“Analyst James
McQuivey, of Forrester Research, thinks EMI’s move will allow the other music industry giants to sit back
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Although some have applauded the Apple-EMI arrangement,125 others have
criticized it on account of the higher price of the DRM-free files, continued use of a
largely non-interoperable file format for encoding files, and the fact that consumer
personal data is also apparently encoded in the DRM-free digital musical file itself, likely
as an anti-piracy measure.126 Further, while giving consumers greater choices with
respect to DRM, the Apple-EMI arrangement does not necessarily give consumers more
options as their purchases may not be interoperable with dominant industry file formats,
at least with the ease that has come to characterize Apple products. As a result, some
have suggested that Apple’s announcement for digital distribution of EMI’s catalog in
DRM-free AAC format may be a sophisticated stratagem implemented to outmaneuver
Apple competitors, including Microsoft.127 Thus, the agreement with EMI may give
Apple an advantage when it comes to setting the dominant “open” standard for digital
music distribution.128
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

¶31

The extent to which Apple is playing fair should be assessed from both a legal and
business perspective. Apple’s iPod/iTMS bundling practices and the iPod/iTMS network
should be assessed in light of their competitive implications. Evaluating the competitive
impact of the iPod/iTMS bundle and other technological innovations may be complicated
by the potential interaction of intellectual property and antitrust legal frameworks. From
an intellectual property perspective, greater attention should be given to the market
impact of intellectual property rights and their exercise. This would mean that
considerations of intellectual property, particularly in the technology arena, should be

and watch. He says, ‘Six months from now, there will be proof as to whether this was the right idea or
not.’”).
125
Norwegian Official Applauds Apple, EMI, MACNN, Apr. 2, 2007,
http://www.macnn.com/articles/07/04/02/norway.applauds.apple.emi.
126
See Posting of Jenn K. Lee to anythingbutipod, supra note 115; Rhys Blakely, Personal Data Found
Hidden in iTunes Tracks, TimesOnline, June 1, 2007, at
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/media/article1871173.ece (noting that Apple
DRM-free music files have "embedded personal information into music files bought from its iTunes online
music store").
127
Arik Hesseldahl, Apple Stokes a Digital Music Standards War, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 5, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2007/tc20070404_499334.htm (“Using AAC is
brilliant for several reasons. First, for Apple, whose stated market aim is to do everything in its power to
sell more of its highly profitable iPods (and beginning in June, presumably profitable iPhones), the choice
of AAC means more non-Apple devices will be able to play songs purchased on iTunes. . . . But the real
target is Microsoft. What we now have is a good old-fashioned standards war heating up, and it is pitting
the old foes Apple and Microsoft against each other once again. Saying Apple has the upper hand is giving
Microsoft more credit than it deserves. . . . Apple will no doubt be fine with the longer list of online music
rivals, because in its range of priorities, anything that sells more iPods can only be a good thing. With
time, practically all music stores will be selling iPod-compatible songs. This will be considered a Richter
10 event at Microsoft. . . . Think of it: Microsoft labeling its second Zune player as ‘compatible with
iTunes.’”) (emphasis added). See also Eliot Van Buskirk, In EMI-ITunes Deal, the Big Loser May Be
Microsoft, WIRED, Apr. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2007/04/emihardware_0403 (Apple “has also struck a
major blow against Microsoft in a less obvious arena: music encoding standards.”); see, e.g., Sharpe &
Arewa, supra note 2.
128
Hesseldahl, supra note 127; Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 2 (discussing the potential emergence of AAC
as the default standard format for digital music).
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attuned to any potentially anticompetitive uses of intellectual property rights.129
Anticompetitive practices bolstered by intellectual property rights or claims of such rights
can potentially give unwarranted market power to holders of intellectual property rights,
impose broader social costs and hinder the innovation that intellectual property
frameworks are intended to promote.130 Further, intellectual property rights can and are
exercised in such a way as to have anticompetitive effects.131
¶32
Apple’s products have to date been notable for their ease of use.132 Although the
influence of the Apple arrangement with EMI remains unclear, during the period in
which it has sold music protected by DRM, Apple has refused to extend its customary
ease of use to certain iPod and iTMS specific activities. Apple’s construction of the
iPod/iTMS network reflects a policy of deliberate noninteroperability that makes it more
difficult for iPod and iTMS users to use players and online music stores that compete
with Apple’s devices and products, and thus more difficult for users to the leave the
iPod/iTMS network.133 This policy lends support to those who argue that Apple’s
motivations are largely anticompetitive.134 Use of DRM protected and unprotected file
formats that are not widely used have strengthened the exclusive aspects of the Apple
iPod/iTunes network; however, Apple’s use of DRM and the AAC file formats does not
necessarily enhance consumer welfare.135
¶33
Even without DRM and use of the AAC encoding format, the dominance of Apple
might limit the market impact of potentially competitive products. If truly competitive
products began to emerge, Apple would be required to outperform its competitors based
on a superior product and business acumen. Although Apple’s performance is at present
outstanding by many measures, the current market environment, in which Apple has few
effective competitors, may encourage it to become complacent. Further, under the status
quo, Apple’s successful domination of the market for digital music players and online
music downloads has allowed the company to sell and operate a product that may not be
inspired to improve in quality as quickly as it might with competitors in the fray. Further,
Apple’s market power does not exclusively stem from positive network effects, but is in
large part wedded to its exercise of proprietary strategies that include a significant
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exercise of intellectual property rights.136 In this way, Apple is not necessarily a “natural”
monopoly, but an “unnatural” one.
¶34
Antitrust laws consider how industry specific regulatory goals and objectives
influence competition and business conduct in that industry.137 In networked industries,
courts must consider “the nature of the network and the market in which it operates”
when determining whether or not a practice is anticompetitive.138 While companies
should not necessarily be forced to “open up [their] networks and provide interconnection
against [their] will,”139 one important factor to consider in antitrust analysis of intellectual
property intensive products and services is the influence of any asserted intellectual
property rights, the scope of such rights, and the extent to which other less restrictive
alternatives may exist. Thus, antitrust agencies and the courts must be cognizant of the
scope of the intellectual property rights and any unlawful extension beyond it.140 While
conclusions cannot be drawn a priori with respect to any particular case, such factors
should be considered in making determinations in cases involving intellectual property
intensive products and services.
¶35
Although the legal status of Apple’s bundling practices is presently contested, from
a business perspective, Apple may not have learned the lessons of the potential dangers
of bundling evident in the recent experiences of the recording industry. Apple ignores
such lessons at its peril. Many commentators and industry analyst agree consumers will
leave an exclusive network in favor of one that offers an open network compatible with a
variety of offerings from various competitors.141 Dr. Mark Cooper, Director of Research
for the Consumer Federation of America stated in recent testimony before congress that
“consumers demand interoperability, and will pick it when given the choice.”142 In the
same Congressional hearing, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas expressed the
following: “[a]s a result of disputes like the one between Apple and Real, some have
suggested that efforts to boost digital music interoperability should be encouraged by
regulation or legislation. Others have urged Congress to leave the issue to the
marketplace and let consumers decide what it best for them.”143 Both alternatives are
possible outcomes in the Apple FairPlay controversy.
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This Article suggests ways in which authorities making determinations of whether
to take regulatory action in cases such as the Apple iPod/iTMS bundle can frame and
view the iPod/iTMS network and Apple business practices within the broader market
context. From a legal perspective Apple’s use of AAC and FairPlay DRM may not
fundamentally controvert existing antitrust laws. Apple’s current bundling business
strategy, however, may not be sustainable in the long term from a business perspective.
Further, in many respects, criticisms of Apple DRM and use of AAC encoding reflect the
fact that Apple may be a victim of its own success. Because Apple and its products have
come to define an era, some say even the twenty first century,144 significant expectations
exist about the role that Apple should play in relation to important digital era issues. By
constraining consumer choices of file formats in a manner that seemingly restricts
interoperability and that appears to be inconsistent with its ethos of enabling ease of use,
Apple may fail to fulfill the expectations of those who believe Apple to be different, in
line with Apple’s marketing as the anti-Microsoft or a company that is unlike many of its
competitors. Apple likely could enable ease of use through supporting multiple formats,
with or without DRM, without significant harm to the iPod franchise. The refusal to do
so may strike some as willful blindness,145 particularly given the historical experience of
Apple in the computer market.
¶37
In the past, Apple’s Macintosh computer suffered the effects often seen in closed
networks. Although it was “highly respected for its design,” it eventually lost market
share because “it was incompatible with other systems.”146 Only time will tell if the iPod
and iTMS will suffer the same fate as the Macintosh computer or follow along the path of
the recording industry, whose bundling practices did not adequately prepare it for the
changes that occurred in the digital era. History, however, does have a way of repeating
itself. Therefore, Apple, once bitten, should be twice shy and consider opening its
network and foregoing short-term profits in the interest of long-term success.
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